THE BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION DIR4ECTIVE AND THE SINGLE R

The new European rules on bank insolvency seek to prevent future government-funded bailouts. Instead, risks should be internalized by the participants. The rules in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and also the Single Resolution Mechanism s
eek to mimic the outcome of a normal insolvency procedures, without actually letting a failing institution enter full insolvency procedures. The rules enacted are of critical importance to a healthier and more stable financial sector.

This b
ook presents three reports in which the new rules are explained and criticized where needed. Professor Joossen discusses the bail-in mechanisms, while Nuijten analyses the legal protection offered to stakeholders against intervention under the Single
Resolution Mechanism - or the lack thereof. Finally, Clancy considers the potential use of the new resolution tools in the context of counterparties, in particular repo and derivative counterparties to a financial institution.